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THE CRISIS IN ARMS CONTROLt 
Harold K. Jacobson* 
There is general agreement among observers of contemporary interna-
tional affairs, and national and international officials from all sides, that 
there is a serious crisis in arms control. As of January 1984, the Soviet 
Union had broken off two major arms control negotiations: the Intermedi-
ate-Range Nuclear Force Talks (INF) and the Strategic Arms Reduction 
Talks (START). Negotiations in the United Nations Conference on Dis-
armament (CD) on a variety of arms control issues were stalemated. The 
United States was engaged in a large-scale military build up, and there was 
no sig~ that the Soviet Union would abate the extensive military programs 
that it had started in the 1960's; indeed, its leadership had declared that the 
USSR would match U.S. efforts. Rhetorical exchanges between the United 
States and the USSR were harsh. Each side had publicly accused the other 
of violating existing arms control agreements. Since the signing of the lim-
ited nuclear weapon test ban treaty the prospects for arms control had never 
appeared bleaker. 
Analyses oftthe causes of the crisis abound. Few of these, however, pen-
etrate the crisis' full potential depth. If the conceptual and political consen-
sus which underlay the progress achieved in arms control starting in 1963 
has evaporated, regaining the momentum in arms control will be more diffi-
cult than most observers have predicted. 
How serious and long-lasting the crisis really is will be known only in 
the future, but exploring its potential depth now may serve to foreclose the 
worst possibilities. Portraying the possible destruction of the consensus, 
and the cost of this, could serve to prevent it from occurring. This assumes 
that the progress that has been achieved in the period since the conclusion 
of World War II, and especially since 1963, should be valued, nurtured and 
extended. Supporting this assumption, therefore, is a necessary preliminary 
step to analyzing the crisis. Then it will be possible to explore why progress 
has been possible and how the foundation of this progress may now be in 
jeopardy. 
I. EFFORTS TO ACHIEVE DISARMAMENT AND THE REGULATION OF 
ARMAMENTS BEFORE 1945 
A major reason that the post-World War II arms control accomplish-
t Earlier versions of this article were presented to seminars at the Graduate Institute of 
International Studies, University of Geneva and the University of Bergen. I am grateful for 
the comments made during the seminar discussions, for the constructive suggestions of my 
colleagues at the Wilson Center, Peter Kruger and W.Y. Smith, and also for the research 
assistance of Jeffrey Coleman, Lydia A. Enochs and Cindy Zimmerman. 
* Jesse S. Reeves Professor of Political Science and Program Director, Center for Political 
Studies, Institute for Social Research, University of Michigan. B.A. 1950, University of Michi-
gan; M.A. 1952; Ph.D. 1955, Yale University. - Ed. 
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ments are so impressive is that so little had been accomplished previously, 
despite the often widespread, deeply-felt desire to achieve disarmament, or 
at least to regulate armaments. Of course, throughout history states that 
were victorious in wars had imposed disarmament on their vanquished ene-
mies. Efforts to achieve disarmament or the regulation of armaments 
through negotiated agreements, however, had yielded few results. 
The Rush-Bagot agreement of 1817 between the United States and Brit-
ain limiting naval forces on the Great Lakes1 was an exceptional achieve-
ment, all the more impressive because of its durability. During the period 
between the two World Wars three treaties came into effect after being 
signed and ratified - the Washington (1922) and London (1930) agree-
ments limiting naval forces2 and the Geneva Protocol (1925) prohibiting 
the use of asphyxiating gases.3 Of these, only the last has endured. The 
first two were of limited duration, and they have been sharply criticized for 
endangering rather than contributing to international security. The League 
of Nations' efforts to achieve disarmament, which were mandated by the 
covenant and which culminated in the 1932 disarmament conference, failed 
dismally. 
At the end of the interwar period, there was broad agreement that the 
regulation of armaments and a fortiori disarmament would be extremely 
difficult to achieve through voluntary agreements.4 The negotiations con-
ducted during the period had revealed seemingly insurmountable technical 
and political obstacles. 
The technical obstacle was the problem of comparability. It is most un-
likely that states would voluntarily accept an agreement that significantly 
altered the existing distribution among them of military power; they might, 
however, accept an agreement that lowered the level of forces without alter-
ing the distribution of power. Even if this were not the case, states engaged 
in a negotiation to regulate armaments would still be interested in assessing 
the effects of potential agreements on the distribution of military power. 
Under either assumption, different types of military forces would have to be 
compared, because the structure of states' military forces differ 
substantially. 
With extensive and exposed land frontiers, the Soviet Union, following 
traditional Russian patterns, has placed particular emphasis on land forces. 
In the current era this has included heavy reliance on land-based, nuclear-
tipped missiles. The United States, like Britain, has given greater emphasis 
1. Rush-Bagot Agreement: Naval Forces on the American Lakes, Apr. 28, 1817, United 
States-Great Britain, 8 Stat. 231, 18 Stat. 296, T.S. No. 110 1/2. 
2. International Treaty for the Limitation and Reduction of Naval Armament, Apr. 22, 
1930, 46 Stat. 2858, T.S. No. 830, 112 L.N.T.S. 65 [hereinafter cited as London Treaty]; Limita-
tion of Naval Armament, Feb. 6, 1922, 43 Stat. 1655, T.S. No. 671, 25 L.N.T.S. 202 [hereinaf-
ter cited as Washington Treaty]. 
3. Protocol for the Prohibition of the Use in War of Asphyxiating, Poisonous or Other 
Gases, and of Bacteriological Methods of Warfare, June 17, 1925, 21 U.S.T. 571, T.I.A.S. No. 
8061, 94 L.N.T.S. 65 [hereinafter cited as Geneva Protocol), reprinted in UNITED STATES ARMS 
CONTROL AND DISARMAMENT AGENCY, ARMS CONTROL AND DISARMAMENT AGREEMENTS, 
14 (5th ed. 1982) [hereinafter cited as DISARMAMENT AGREEMENTS). 
4. For analyses of these difficulties, see generally s. DE MADARIAGA, DISARMAMENT (2d 
printing 1967); H. MORGENTHAU, POLITICS AMONG NATIONS 391-416 (5th ed. 1973). 
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to naval and air forces. Sea-launched ballistic missiles comprise a much 
larger portion of U.S. strategic forces than they do of the USSR's strategic 
forces. For the United States and the Soviet Union each to reduce their 
forces by eliminating one Army or Marine division would lower the United 
States' total of nineteen divisions by more than five percent while it would 
lower the Soviet Union's total of 191 by less than one percent. Because of 
the disproportionate effects of identical reductions, efforts have been made 
to equate different elements of states' military forces, but this is an exceed-
ingly difficult task. How many divisions should the Soviet Union drop to 
counterbalance the United States giving up one aircraft carrier, an element 
of military force in which the United States has numerical superiority? 
Even if the League of Nations disarmament conference in 1932 had been 
able to surmount the political obstacles on which it foundered, the prepara-
tory work provided little ground for optimism that it would have been able 
to devise cuts in military forces that states generally would have regarded as 
comparable. 
The political obstacles, however, proved insurmountable. First, there 
was and is the issue of how states de.fine the military requirements for their 
security. Simply put, states have military forces to provide for their secur-
ity; they are unlikely to restrict or reduce their forces in ways that their 
governments and public feel could jeopardize their security. In the early 
1930's, France and Germany defined the basic requirements for their own 
security in essentially incompatible terms. France insisted on having supe-
riority in mobilized military forces, Germany sought military forces at least 
approaching equality. This basic disagreement blocked any progress, and 
as Germany cast off the limitations imposed on it by the Versailles settle-
ment, no state forcefully objected. 
Another political obstacle concerns the task of creating an international 
organization which all parties could trust to monitor the agreement. It is 
almost a condition of sovereignty that states will seek to create one type of 
device or another to ensure that they can block an international organiza-
tion from taking action against their interests; yet granting this protection 
destroys the confidence that other states might have in the organization. 
Complicated forms of majority voting have been considered, but none have 
overcome this obstacle. 
By World War II, disarmament and the regulation of armaments had 
come to be seen from a considerably different perspective than that which 
had led to the great emphasis on these objectives in the Covenant of the 
League of Nations. The general belief that the failure of France and the 
United Kingdom to have sufficient military forces to deter Germany con-
tributed to the outbreak of World War II combined with an understanding 
of the difficulties facing negotiated reductions, with the result that having 
adequate military force available to defend the existing world order came to 
be seen as a strategy for achieving peace at least equally as important as the 
regulation of armaments and disarmaments. In 1945, governments and in-
formed observers in the West were perhaps even more interested in the 
availability of adequate military forces than they were in reducing them. 
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II. ARMS CONTROL ACCOMPLISHMENTS SINCE WORLD WAR II 
The devastating effect of nuclear weapons, demonstrated through their 
use against Japan, forced reconsideration of these priorities; at a minimum, 
it was thought, nuclear weapons should be controlled and preferably 
banned and eliminated. Negotiations to control and eliminate nuclear 
weapons were launched immediately, and after a time talks were also be-
gun to limit conventional armaments. Even the horror of nuclear war, 
tho?gh, was not a sufficient force to overcome the technical and political 
obstacles that had blocked progress in the regulation of armaments during 
the 1930's.5 As of the mid-1950's, both the Soviet Union and the United 
States had substantial military establishments that included nuclear weap-
ons as integrated components, the two Germanys had begun to rearm and 
most of Europe was divided into opposing military alliances through the 
North Atlantic and Warsaw treaties. This situation persisted through the 
1960's and 1970's and continues into the 1980's. All of the major states 
except Japan maintain military establishments that are large by peacetime 
standards, and the United Kingdom, France and the People's Republic of 
China have joined the United States and the USSR in developing nuclear 
arsenals. India has detonated a nuclear device. How then is it possible to 
argue that there have been important accomplishments in arms control in 
the period since World War II? 
One justification has already been given - compared to the interwar or 
any period of comparable length many more arms control agreements have 
been signed and ratified and have entered into force. Starting with the Ant-
arctica treaty in 1959, the United States has signed twenty new bilateral and 
multilateral treaties and agreements, fully accepting the five agreements, 
ratifying twelve of the treaties and stating its intention to abide by the terms 
of the three that it has not ratified.6 In 1975, the United States finally rati-
fied the 1925 Geneva Protocol. In addition, the rearmament of the Federal 
Republic of Germany has been controlled through the 1954 treaty that es-
tablished the Western European Union (WEU).7 That so many agreements 
have been voluntarily negotiated and put into effect is notable. 
A more important justification to support the argument that there have 
been important accomplishments in arms control in the period since World 
War II, is that these negotiated agreements have had significant beneficial 
consequences in controlling armaments. The proliferation of nuclear weap-
ons, even if Israel and South Africa are added to the six states listed above, 
is much less extensive than anyone as recently as two decades ago predicted 
it would be. Surely the several treaties that constitute the nonproliferation 
regime have contributed to this outcome. The Federal Republic of Ger-
many renounced the right to produce or possess nuclear weapons in the 
WEU treaty; more than ninety states have, acceded to this restriction by 
accepting the 1968 treaty on the nonproliferation of nuclear weapons.8 The 
5. An excellent account of the arms control negotiations is provided in B. BECHHOEFFER, 
POSTWAR NEGOTIATIONS FOR ARMS CONTROL (1961). 
6. The texts of these treaties and a statement of their status can be found in DISARMAMENT 
AGREEMENTS, supra note 3. 
7. WEU Treaty, Oct. 23, 1954, 211 U.N.T.S. 342. 
8. Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, opened for signature July I, 1968, 
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limited test ban treaty, which only permits the testing of nuclear weapons 
underground, precludes all signatories from testing such weapons except 
the small number that have large territories which include sparsely inhab-
ited areas.9 The 1967 Treaty of Tlaltelolco declared Latin America a nu-
clear-free zone. 10 The WEU treaty, the Treaty of Tlaltelolco and the 
International Atomic Energy Agency all established inspection mechanisms 
to provide reassurance that nuclear materials dedicated to peaceful pur-
poses are not diverted to use in the fabrication of weapons. To be sure, the 
nonproliferation regime did not stop India from detonating a nuclear de-
vice in 1974, and it will not necessarily prevent additional states from gain-
ing a nuclear weapons capability. It has, however, sharply limited the 
proliferation of nuclear weapons. It could continue to do this. 
The arms competition between the United States and the Soviet Union 
has been subjected to restraints. Because of the limited test ban treaty, 
neither country has tested nuclear weapons in the atmosphere, in outer 
space or under water since 1963. This has eliminated a major environmen-
tal hazard. It has also meant that neither side can have complete confi-
dence in an anti-ballistic missile system that uses nuclear warheads because 
such systems have never been tested in flight and cannot be by states adher-
ing to the treaty. Because of the treaties, the United States and the Soviet 
Union have been precluded from deploying nuclear weapons in Antarctica, 
in outer space and on the deep seabed. They have agreed to respect the 
nuclear-free character of Latin America. Under the nonproliferation treaty 
they may not transfer nuclear weapons or nuclear weapons technology to 
non-nuclear-weapon states. Under the anti-ballistic missile (ABM) treaty 
and protocol, the Soviet Union and the United States have agreed not to 
deploy more than one ABM system.11 Numerical limits have been set on 
the strategic arsenals of the two sides as a consequence of the interim agree-
ment and the treaty negotiated during the Strategic Arms Limitations Talks 
(SALT). 12 Although these agreements, with the exception of the ABM pro-
tocol, did not lead to a reduction in United States and Soviet armaments, 
they have prevented the two countries from adopting policies involving the 
21 U.S.T. 483, T.I.A.S. No. 6839, 729 U.N.T.S. 161, reprinted in DISARMAMENT AGREEMENTS, 
supra note 3, at 91. 
9. Treaty Banning Nuclear Weapons Tests in the Atmosphere, in Outer Space and Under 
Water, opened far signature Aug. S, 1963, 14 U.N.T.S. 334 [hereinafter cited as Limited Test 
Ban Treaty], reprinted in DISARMAMENT AGREEMENTS, supra note 3, at 41. 
10. Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America, Feb. 14, 1967, 634 
U.N.T.S. 281, reprinted in DISARMAMENT AGREEMENTS, supra note 3, at 64. 
11. Protocol to the Treaty on the Limitation of Anti-Ballistic Missile Systems,)uly 3, 1974, 
United States-Soviet Union, art. I, 27 U.S.T. 164S, 1648, T.I.A.S. No. 8276, reprinted in DIS• 
ARMAMENT AGREEMENTS,supra note 3, at 162; Treaty on the Limitation of Anti-Ballistic Mis-
sile Systems, May 26, 1972, United States-Soviet Union, art. III, 23 U.S.T. 343S, 3440, T.I.A.S. 
No. 7S03 [hereinafter cited 115 the ABM Treaty], reprinted in DISARMAMENT AGREEMENTS, 
supra note 3, at 139. 
12. Treaty on the Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms, June 18, 1979, United Slates• 
Soviet Union, S. Exec. Rep. No. 14, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. 319 [hereinafter cited as SALT II 
Treaty], reprinted in DISARMAMENT AGREEMENTS, supra note 3, at 246; Interim Agreement on 
Certain Measures with Respect to the Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms, May 26, 1972, 
United States-Soviet Union, 23 U.S.T. 3462, T.I.A.S. No. 7504 [hereinafter cited as SALT I 
Interim Agreement], reprinted in DISARMAMENT AGREEMENTS, supra note 3, at ISO. 
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further development and deployment of nuclear weapons. The nuclear 
arsenals of the two countries could have become even more formidable. 
Other agreements have involved measures designed to lessen the risk 
that the United States and the Soviet Union will unintentionally become 
involved in a nuclear exchange, and more broadly to stabilize the military 
relationship between the two countries. Means to insure rapid and accurate 
communication between the heads of government of the two countries have 
been put in place.13 The two countries have agreed to take measures to 
prevent accidents with nuclear weapons and to insure against their unau-
thorized use.14 They have pledged to consult each other in the event of 
third-party conflicts that might escalate and involve them. I5 
More importantly, as a consequence of the ABM treaty and protocol 
and the limited nuclear test ban treaty, the two countries have left them-
selves vulnerable to a retaliatory nuclear strike. This vulnerability is a pow-
erful deterrent against either side launching a nuclear attack against the 
other: neither the government of the United States nor that of the Soviet 
Union seems likely to initiate an action that would surely subject its own 
society to unprecedented devastation. 
In sum, the arms control agreements have limited the proliferation of 
nuclear weapons, put restraints on the development of nuclear weapons, 
limited the places where nuclear weapons can be deployed, created safe-
guards against the unintentional use of nuclear weapons and, by leaving the 
Soviet Union and the United States vulnerable to each other, created a 
strong deterrent against either country using nuclear weapons. Nuclear 
arsenals have been controlled; the term "arms control" accurately describes 
the process and its goals, more so than traditional terms such as "disarma-
ment" and the "regulation" of armaments. The agreements do not make 
the world safe, but they make it safer than it would be without them. Fur-
ther agreements could be negotiated that would make it even safer. These 
agreements will not be achieved, however, unless the current crisis in arms 
control is overcome, and failure to make further progress could place at risk 
what has already been accomplished. 
Ill. THE LIMITED NUCLEAR TEST BAN TREATY AS A PROTOTYPE FOR 
PROGRESS IN .ARMS CONTROL 
The forbidding aspect of the current crisis is that the conceptual and 
political consensus that was thought to underlie the progress in arms control 
may have evaporated. This apparent consensus was forged in the negotia-
13. See Agreement on Measures to Improve the USA-USSR Direct Communications 
Link, Sept. 30, 1971, United States-Soviet "Qnion, 22 U.S.T. 1598, T.I.A.S. No. 7187, reprinted 
in DISARMAMENT AGREEMENTS, supra note 3, at 115; Memorandum of Understanding Re-
garding the Establishment of a Direct Communications Link, July 20, 1963, United States-
Soviet Union, 14 U.S.T. 825, T.I.A.S. No. 5362, reprinted in DISARMAMENT AGREEMENTS, 
supra note 3, at 31. 
14. See Agreement on Measures to Reduce the Risk of Outbreak of Nuclear War, Sept. 
30, 1971, United States-Soviet Union, 22 U.S.T. 1590, T.I.A.S. 7186, reprinted in DISARMA-
MENT AGREEMENTS, supra note 3, at 111. 
15. See Agreement on the Prevention of Nuclear War, June 22, 1973, United States-Soviet 
Union, art. IV, 24 U.N.T.S. 1478, T.I.A.S. No. 7654, reprinted in DISARMAMENT AGREEMENTS, 
supra note 3, at 159. 
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tions that led to the limited nuclear test ban treaty. The limited test ban 
treaty became a prototype for other treaties limiting nuclear weapons. Un-
derstanding it, and the full context of its negotiation and acceptance, is cru-
cial to understanding the progress that has been achieved and also the 
current crisis. 16 
The treaty is very simple. It consists of a preamble and five articles. 
The first article states the basic obligation not to test nuclear weapons in the 
atmosphere, in outer space or under water. The second article provides a 
mechanism for amending the treaty. The third article states the conditions 
for the treaty to enter into effect and for states other than the three original 
parties, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, the United Kingdom and 
the United States, to accede to the treaty. According to the fourth article, 
the treaty is of unlimited duration, except that a party may withdraw by 
giving three months notice "if it decides that extraordinary events, related 
to the subject matter of this Treaty, have jeopardized the supreme interests 
of its country." 17 The final article makes the English and Russian texts 
"equally authentic." 
Several observations are in order. First, the treaty avoided the technical 
problem of comparability by not requiring states to reduce their military 
forces, but simply requiring them to desist from further testing of nuclear 
weapons. Of course, the ban on testing would affect the Soviet Union and 
the United States in different ways since the two countries had pursued 
testing programs that emphasized different types of weapons: the Soviet 
Union had done more testing of weapons with large yields - the type of 
testing that could not be conducted underground - than the United States. 
There was no effort, however, to include in the treaty a provision that 
would equate the technical progress of the two sides. Instead, by simply 
precluding all but underground testing, governments were left to determine 
whether it would be in their interests to adhere to the limited ban, and to 
take whatever compensatory measures they might feel would be appropri-
ate through underground testing or some _other means. 
Second, the treaty avoided the political problem of diminishing the felt 
security of any of the original parties because it did not require them to 
reduce their military forces, but merely to desist from further development, 
a course that could have made one or all of the original parties feel even 
more insecure. 
The treaty avoided the political problem of attempting to create an in-
ternational institution that all parties could trust to serve as a control mech-
anism for the agreement, by relying instead on national technical means 
(NTMs) for monitoring compliance. Until the signing of the limited test 
ban treaty, from as far back as the end of World War I, it had generally 
been assumed that agreements for the regulation of armaments would nec-
essarily involve the creation of international institutions that would be re-
sponsible for monitoring compliance with the agreements and for imposing 
16. This analysis draws heavily on the work that Eric Stein and I did for our book D1PLO· 
MATS, SCIENTISTS, AND POLITICIANS: THE UNITED STATES AND THE NUCLEAR TEST BAN 
NEGOTIATIONS (1966). 
17. Limited Test Ban Treaty, supra note 9, art. IV. 
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sanctions if there were infractions. 18 Failure to agree on the decision-mak-
ing procedures of such an institution had been one of the major reasons the 
early negotiations to control nuclear weapons had foundered. In 1963, al-
though the negotiations to ban nuclear weapons tests had been in progress 
for five years, major issues concerning the international organization that 
would police the agreement remained unresolved, and it was not at all cer-
tain that agreement would be possible. The conclusion that all but under-
ground tests could be adequately monitored by NTMs meant that these 
controversies could be sidestepped. 
The issue of imposing sanctions if a party to the agreement were to 
break it was also avoided. The only provision in the treaty relating to the 
issue of sanctions is article 4, which allows parties to withdraw by giving 
three months' notice. This provision recognized that the only real sanction 
if one party were to break the agreement would be for the other side to 
resume testing. The article recognized that at least three months would be 
required to mount a retaliatory test series; thus, giving three months' notice 
to withdraw would not impose a liability or inhibition on a wronged party. 
The control mechanism for the limited test ban treaty thus consists of 
national technical means as the method of surveillance and adversary retal-
iatory testing as the sanction for a breach of the agreement. Allowing con-
tinued testing of nuclear weapons underground was related to both aspects. 
Rightly or wrongly, U.S. officials concluded that national technical means 
would not provide adequate surveillance of underground testing. U.S. offi-
cials also concluded that for the threat of retaliatory testing to be credible, 
U.S. weapons laboratories would have to maintain active programs. They 
felt that this would be difficult unless some weapons could be tested; good 
scientists would be unwilling to work on projects that could never be 
brought to the stage of actual testing. 
Maintaining a credible deterrent was an important issue because on 
September 1, 1961, the Soviet Union broke the moratorium on testing nu-
clear weapons that had been in effect since the negotiations began in 1958 
by launching the most extensive series of tests ever conducted, a series that 
would involve the most destructive weapons ever tested. In December, 
1959, President Eisenhower had stated that because of lack of progress in 
the negotiations, the United States would consider itself free to resume test-
ing, although it would not do so without announcing its intention in ad-
vance of any resumption. The -United States did not prepare for a new 
series ohests in the atmosphere, however, so that it was April 1962 before it 
began a retaliatory test series. Many U.S. government officials felt that un-
less the Unitefi States maintained a capacity to test, the USSR might again 
unexpectedly test nuclear weapons in the atmosphere. As it was, the Soviet 
Union conducted another series of tests in December 1962, and thus was 
the last of the original parties to the limited ban treaty to test nuclear weap-
ons in the atmosphere. The Soviet Union's test series in 1961 and 1962 
18. It should be noted, however, that neither the Washington Treaty, supra note 3, nor the 
London Treaty, supra note 2, regulating naval armaments provided for inspection or enforce-
ment mechanisms. The types of naval vessels that were regulated probably could not have 
been constructed in secret. In this sense, the Washington and London Treaties are forerun-
ners of the post-World War II treaties that rely on national technical means for verification. 
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were conducted despite the decree that the Supreme Soviet adopted on 
March 31, 1958, resolving to discontinue all types of nuclear weapons tests. 
On several occasions during the debate in the United States on the ratifica-
tion of the limited test ban treaty, the Kennedy administration gave assur-
ances that as a deterrent against the USSR's breaking the treaty, the United 
States would maintain a readiness to resume testing of nuclear weapons in 
the atmosphere. 
Although various individuals and groups in the United States found the 
limited test ban treaty less than completely satisfactory from their point of 
view, it nevertheless commanded widespread support. Those who were pri-
marily interested in achieving the regulation of armaments, and ultimately 
disarmament, would have preferred a comprehensive test ban. Some mili-
tary officials and scientists, particularly those associated with the Lawrence 
laboratory at Livermore, California, worried that the treaty would place the 
United States at a military disadvantage. The Soviet Union was using 
high-yield warheads to compensate for the fact that the guidance systems 
for its missiles were not as accurate as the U.S. systems. It was foreseeable 
that when the USSR caught up with the United States in this respect (and it 
has) its advantage in high-yield weapons would continue to exist and the 
United States' compensating advantage would have disappeared. The Joint 
Chiefs of Staff, nevertheless, collectively and individually supported the rat-
ification of the treaty. It should be noted, though, that the limited nuclear 
test ban treaty was negotiated at a time when the United States was en-
gaged in extensive build up of its military forces; the Joint Chiefs had am-
ple reason to believe that whatever military disadvantages the treaty might 
involve, compensating actions would be taken. An overwhelming majority 
of other U.S. officials also supported ratification of the treaty. Whatever 
reservations individuals and groups may have had about the treaty there 
was broad consensus that the United States and the world were better off 
with the treaty than they would be without it. 
On September 24, 1963, the U.S. Senate voted eighty to nineteen to give 
its advice and consent to the ratification of the limited test ban treaty, and 
the following day the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR unani-
mously voted to ratify it. The international consensus appeared to be 
sealed. 
The nuclear test ban treaty is an important measure of arms control. To 
reiterate its benefits, it protects the atmosphere against environmental deg-
radation, it is an important instrument against the proliferation of nuclear 
weapons, and it is an inhibition against the development of some types of 
ABM systems. 
Subsequent arms control agreements have been modeled on the limited 
nuclear test ban treaty. They have usually not involved reducing military 
forces in being, but rather renouncing possible actions that have not yet 
been taken. Progress has been limited and incremental. When the treaties 
have involved the military establishments of the United States and the So-
viet Union, the agreements have relied on NTMs for surveillance of com-
pliance with the terms of the agreements and on the possibility of adversary 
retaliation as a potential sanction against failure to comply. Only the trea-
ties that comprise the nonproliferation regime provide for control mecha-
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nisms operated by international institutions, and these have only limited 
and voluntary application to the nuclear-weapon states. 
IV. THE EMERGENCE OF THE CRISIS 
Until the mid-1970's, it seemed that the apparent consensus forged 
within the United States and between the United States and the Soviet 
Union in the negotiations that led to the limited nuclear test ban treaty, and 
the model of the treaty, could provide the impulse for continued progress in 
arms control for many years to come. How has this prospect been called 
into question? 
In the United States, arms control has become a political issue. Both 
Jimmy Carter in 1976 and Ronald Reagan in 1980 attacked the arms con-
trol record of the incumbent president as important parts of their presiden-
tial campaigns. Carter and Reagan each, rather than promising to build on 
the achievements of his predecessor, pledged to demonstrate a new ap-
proach. Carter initiated the process of making arms control a political issue 
by arguing that President Ford had not done enough to reduce armaments, 
especially nuclear weapons. 
The administrations of Richard Nixon and Gerald Ford had taken steps 
to extend the limited ban on nuclear testing to include some underground 
testing and to place a quantitative limit on U.S. and Soviet strategic nuclear 
forces. In 1974, the United States and the Soviet Union signed a treaty that 
prohibited conducting underground nuclear explosions with a yield of more 
than 150 kilotons; all nuclear explosions in any other environment were 
already prohibited by the limited test ban treaty. 19 Under the protocol to 
the treaty the two sides agreed to exchange information on the yields of 
weapons tested at their underground sites, as well as geophysical data con-
cerning these sites to facilitate the calibration of the other parties' seismic 
instruments - in other words, to facilitate detection by NTMs. Two years 
later, in 1976, the two countries signed a treaty that would allow the con-
ducting of underground peaceful nuclear explosions (PNEs) at sites other 
than those on which information had been exchanged under the terms of 
the threshold test ban treaty; explosions could be conducted at such sites, 
however, only under conditions that provided for on-site inspections.20 
Control of PNEs is essential because there is no basic difference between 
the technology of a PNE and of a nuclear weapon. 
The U.S. government had never been wholly confident, especially with 
respect to explosions having lower yields, that, relying solely on national 
technical means, it could distinguish underground nuclear explosions from 
earthquakes. For this reason, from the outset of the negotiations to ban 
nuclear testing, the United States had insisted that if underground testing 
were to be prohibited, the agreement would have to provide for on-site in-
spections so that suspicious seismic events could be investigated. The So-
19. Treaty on the Limitation of Underground Nuclear Weapons Tests, July 3, 1974, art. I, 
United States-Soviet Union, S. Exec. Doc. No. N, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 5-6, reprinted in DIS• 
ARMAMENT AGREEMENTS, supra note 3, at 167. 
20. Treaty on Underground Nuclear Explosions for Peaceful Purposes, May 28, 1976, arts. 
3, 4, United States-Soviet Union, S. Exec. Doc. No. N, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 10-12, reprinted in 
DISARMAMENT AGREEMENTS, supra note 3, at 173. 
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viet Union, on the other hand, was very reluctant to allow on-site 
inspections. The two treaties were steps toward breaking this impasse. In 
the 1974 agreement the United States acknowledged that it could have rea-
sonable confidence in its ability to detect underground tests of nuclear 
weapons that had a yield of more than 150 kilotons. By allowing on-site 
inspections in the 1976 treaty, the Soviet Union acknowledged that they 
might be necessary. Experience with on-site inspections could show how 
essential they really were, or might make them less essential by allowing the 
confirmation and calibration of national technical means of detection. Ex-
perience could also provide a test for the USSR of how intrusive they might 
be. 
The two treaties could be seen as forerunners of a comprehensive ban 
on testing nuclear weapons. There has always been opposition in the U.S. 
government, however, to a comprehensive test ban (CTB), irrespective of 
the U.S.'s ability to monitor compliance with such an agreement. This op-
position is based on a desire to improve the efficiency and safety of weap-
ons, to maintain a testing capability as a deterrent against the limited test 
ban being broken and to proof-test weapons to insure that they continue to 
function properly after many years of storage. This opposition would have 
to be overcome for the United States to agree to a comprehensive test ban. 
In 1972, as part of the SALT negotiations, the United States and the 
Soviet Union signed the Interim Agreement on the Limitation of Offensive 
Weapons.21 This agreement committed the two sides for a period of five 
years not to deploy strategic ballistic missile launchers beyond those that 
were already deployed or under construction. This interim agreement was 
to be the first step toward a more permanent and far-reaching limitation of 
the two sides' strategic nuclear arms. Negotiations proceeded toward this 
objective, and in 1974 at Vladivostok President Gerald Ford and Chairman 
Leonid Brezhnev agreed that the prospective treaty should limit each of the 
two sides to 2,400 launchers of strategic nuclear delivery vehicles, no more 
than 1,320 of which should be launchers for missiles with multiple indepen-
dently-targeted reentry vehicles (MIRVs). The United States had sought 
but failed to win Soviet agreement for a lower number that could have 
required the USSR to reduce its modem heavy intercontinental ballistic 
missile (ICBM) force. The Soviet Union would have had to reduce the 
number of its launchers only slightly to comply with the 2,400 ceiling while 
the United States could have increased the number of its launchers. The 
Ford administration saw the Vladivostok agreement as an important step 
toward achieving a strategic arms limitation treaty. It also regarded the 
equal ceilings as an improvement over the U.S. inferiority imposed by the 
Interim Agreement. Although the goal of achieving a strategic arms limita-
tion treaty was of some urgency because the Interim Agreement would ex-
pire in 1977, it had not been gained by the time of the 1976 presidential 
campaign. 
During the campaign, Jimmy Carter attacked the underground thresh-
old test ban treaty and the entire concept of peaceful nuclear explosions, 
and argued that what was needed was a comprehensive test ban. He also 
attacked the Vladivostok numerical ceilings, arguing that they were too 
21. SALT I Interim Agreement, supra note 12. 
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high and would allow an arms build up rather than providing arms control. 
He pledged to reduce the defense budget $5 to $7 billion below the planned 
figure. 
After his election, President Carter did not press the Senate to give its 
advice and consent to the two treaties dealing with underground nuclear 
explosions, but instead sought to achieve a comprehensive test ban. By the 
end of his administration, agreement had not been reached on a CTB, and 
the two treaties remained unratified. 
With respect to the limitation of strategic nuclear arms, in the early days 
of his administration, Carter decided to try to press for ceilings that were 
lower than those agreed to at Vladivostok: he proposed a total number of 
launchers between 1,800 and 2,000 of which only 1,100 or 1,200 could have 
MIRVs. These ceilings would have required the USSR to reduce the 
number of strategic nuclear launchers that it had by almost twenty-five per-
cent; the U.S. reduction would have been less than five percent. The USSR 
rejected Carter's proposal. When the SALT treaty was finally signed in 
June 1979 the initial ceilings set for strategic nuclear weapon launchers 
were 2,400, of which only 1,320 could be missiles with MIRVs, exactly the 
ceilings that had been argued on at Vladivostok.22 The treaty did provide, 
however, that as of January 1, 1982, the overall ceiling would be lowered to 
2,250. Carter submitted the treaty to the Senate to gain its advice and con-
sent to ratification, but on January 3, 1980, after the Soviet invasion of Af-
ghanistan, he asked the Senate to defer consideration of the treaty. 
Whether or not the Senate would have given its consent to ratification of 
the SALT treaty had the Soviet Union not invaded Afghanistan is moot. 
Both liberals and conservatives in the Senate attacked the treaty because 
the ceilings that it set were too high; they did not do enough to reduce the 
number of nuclear weapons. The liberals simply wanted the total reduced; 
the conservatives particularly wanted the USSR to reduce the number of 
heavy missiles that it had deployed, missiles which the conservatives be-
lieved threatened the U.S. ICBM force. The conservatives also questioned 
whether the treaty could be verified adequately. Furthermore, they were 
skeptical of the wisdom of entering into an arms control agreement with the 
Soviet Union when it was engaged - in their eyes - in conduct that 
threatened U.S. interests in the Third World, and when the United States 
was not doing enough to ensure the adequacy of its own military forces. In 
constant dollars the military budgets for fiscal year 1978, which began Oc-
tober l, 1977 and which was the first full year of the Carter Presidency, and 
for fiscal year 1979 were less than the budget for fiscal year 1977, even 
though in current dollars they were larger. Inflation more than absorbed 
the increase. The military budget for fiscal year 1980 - again in constant 
dollars - was less than one percent higher than that for fiscal year 1977. 
As president, Carter thus essentially fulfilled his campaign pledge to cut the 
military budget. 
During the 1980 presidential campaign Ronald Reagan asserted that the 
SALT treaty was "fatally flawed," because, among other reasons, it did not 
provide for significant reductions. He pledged to build up U.S. military 
22. SALT II Treaty, supra note 12, arts. III, IV. 
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forces, arguing that this would induce the Soviet Union to accept sharp 
reductions in nuclear forces. When he became president, Reagan began an 
extensive military build up: The military budgets for fiscal years 1981 and 
1982 were each more than eleven percent larger in constant dollars than 
that of the preceding year, and that for fiscal year 1983 was almost nine 
percent larger. Although President Reagan announced that the United 
States would abide by the terms of the SALT treaty as long as the Soviet 
Union did too, he refused to press for ratification of the treaty. He renamed 
the SALT negotiations the Strategic Arms Reduction Talks (START) and 
sought deep reductions in Soviet and American strategic nuclear arsenals. 
In 1982 he broke off the talks concerning a comprehensive test ban and 
announced that he would not press for ratification of the threshold test ban 
and PNE treaties unless they were improved, specifically by greater provi-
sion for on-site inspections, but the Soviet Union refused to reopen the 
negotiations. 
Carter's and Reagan's actions symbolize a broad politicization within 
the United States of arms control issues; these issues have become a matter 
of partisan controversy. Moreover, the course that was pursued from the 
signing of the limited test ban treaty through the PNE agreement has come 
under attack from both ends of the political spectrum. With respect to stra-
tegic weapons, both left and right argue that much lower ceilings than those 
provided for in the SALT treaty are necessary. With respect to under-
ground testing and PNE, in contrast, the two sides differ sharply: the left is 
determined to achieve a comprehensive test ban, while the right would 
abandon efforts to control underground explosions. The sharpness of the 
debate about arms control and the failure of the Senate to give its advice 
and consent to the ratification of the three treaties puts in question the abil-
ity of the United States to ratify any treaty. 
Of course, a treaty involving deep cuts in the strategic nuclear arsenals 
of the United States and the Soviet Union which did not weaken the U.S. 
sense of security would be very welcome to Americans of virtually all polit-
ical persuasions. The problem is that to negotiate such a treaty the two 
sides would have to address and surmount the technical problem of compa-
rability, the problem that plagued negotiations prior to 1963. The strategic 
nuclear forces of the Soviet Union and the United States have quite differ-
ent structures; to reduce them sharply without seriously disadvantaging one 
side or the other would be extremely difficult. 
Further dimmine the prospects for arms control, it is not clear now that 
the United States and the Soviet Union hold the same concept of the goals 
of the process that began in 1963 with the limited nuclear test ban treaty. 
The apparent consensus between the two states may have been short-lived 
or even illusory. To be sure, the United States and the Soviet Union con-
tinue to agree on the modalities embodied in the limited nuclear test ban 
treaty; reliance on NTMs for surveillance and the possibility of adversary 
retaliation as the potential sanction against infractions. The two countries 
seem, however, to have had different expectations about the broader conse-
quences of a series of agreements based on these modalities. 
There has been a widespread expectation in the United States that as 
more and more arms control agreements came into effect, the arms race 
between the Soviet Union and the United States would be slowed and ulti-
mately reversed. Furthermore, there was also a general expectation that as 
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the military relationship between the two countries was stabilized and made 
less tense, their propensity to clash throughout the world would be 
moderated. 
Starting with the seven-year plan that began in 1959, the USSR's mili-
tary expenditures have risen steadily, resulting in a continual and substan-
tial military build up.23 Rather than stopping the deployment of strategic 
nuclear delivery vehicles when it achieved numerical parity with the United 
States, as many Americans expected would happen, the Soviet Union con-
tinued to deploy more and more weapons until ceilings were set by the 
Interim Agreement and the SALT treaty. Modernization of weapons con-
tinued within the framework of these ceilings, and there has been increased 
deployment of weapons not covered by them. Serious allegations have 
been raised that the Soviet Union has violated other arms control agree-
ments, the first two of which it has ratified: the 1925 Protocol for the Prohi-
bition of the Use in War of Asphyxiating, Poisonous or Other Gases, and of 
Bacteriological Methods ofWarfare;24 the 1972 Treaty on the Limitation of 
Anti-Ballistic Missile systems;25 and the 1979 Treaty on the Limitation of 
Strategic Offensive Arms.26 Since the mid-1970's, the Soviet Union has 
abetted and given substantial material assistance to forces that threatened 
W estem interests in Africa, the Middle East, the Caribbean and Central 
America. 
It seems clear from the pronouncements of Soviet leaders that the USSR 
never intended by engaging in the arms control process to limit its freedom 
to support what it viewed as revolutionary forces in the Third World. To 
accept such a limitation would involve the USSR's renouncing its commit-
ment to support what it views as the progressive movement of history. This 
poses in acute terms the issue of linkage - to what extent should the 
United States make its agreement to arms control measures conditional on 
Soviet restraint in the Third World. This issue did not arise at the time of 
the signing of the limited nuclear test ban treaty, nor for about a decade 
thereafter, but it cannot be avoided in the 1980's. In many ways the issue is 
similar to one faced in the interwar period and specifically at the League of 
Nations disarmament conference - can arms control be achieved in the 
absence of a political agreement or must a political agreement precede the 
acceptance of arms control? 
It also seems clear that the Soviet Union will not willingly accept a mili-
tary position that it perceives as being inferior to the United States. The 
purpose of the Soviet military build up is difficult to fathom, at least partly 
because of the degree of secrecy in which the USSR enshrouds its military 
affairs. Given this basic uncertainty, it is hard to understand fully how the 
Soviet Union conceived that arms control would serve its interests. Did it 
see arms control as a way of freezing situations where it had a military 
advantage, or as blocking United States weapons developments so that it 
could catch up, as some Americans have alleged, or did it see it as a more 
neutral device for stabilizing dangerous relationships? Does the USSR re-
r 
23. This arms build up is described and analyzed in D. HOLLOWAY, THE SOVIET UNION 
AND THE ARMS RACE (1983). 
24. Geneva Protocol, supra note 3. 
25. ABM Treaty, supra note 11. 
26. SALT II Treaty, supra note 12. 
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gard its having anything less than military superiority as putting it in a 
position of inferiority? 
The inability to answer these questions with certainty contributes to the 
tendency in the United States to seek deep cuts in the strategic nuclear arse-
nals of the two countries. Given the Soviet insistence on not being placed in 
a position that it would regard as involving military inferiority and U.S. 
suspicion about Soviet intentions, the technical problem of comparability 
will inescapably be a central issue in any negotiation aimed at achieving 
substantial reductions. 
If an agreement provided for substantial reductions, infractions would 
have more serious military consequences than if the parties' arsenals were 
larger. Thus, verification is a more serious issue in negotiations aimed at 
deep cuts. Suspicion that the Soviet Union has violated existing arms con-
trol agreements has already raised the demands for certainty that the 
United States places on verification systems. Moreover, the evolving weap-
ons technology has substantially increased the difficulty of verifying arms 
control agreements. Cruise missiles, which the United States has started to 
deploy and which the Soviet Union is developing, can carry either nuclear 
or conventional warheads. They are small and mobile and easy to conceal. 
All of these factors throw into question the adequacy of nonintrusive na-
tional technical means - essentially observation satellites - to monitor 
future arms control agreements. If NTMs are not adequate, then more 
elaborate verification systems, perhaps under international control, will be 
required. Unfortunately, devising such systems has generally eluded negoti-
ators aiming toward the regulation of armaments or disarmament. 
V. PROSPECTS FOR ARMS CONTROL 
What then are the prospects for arms control? If the apparent consensus 
that made possible the limited nuclear test ban treaty and the several trea-
ties and agreements that followed it has evaporated, they are indeed bleak, 
because progress in arms control would require overcoming obstacles that 
before 1963 consistently blocked the achievement of agreements. 
Perhaps these obstacles can be overcome. Public revulsion against nu-
clear weapons seems greater than it ever has been. President Reagan and 
the U.S. Catholic bishops agree that the current situation - in which the 
ultimate guarantee against either side launching a first strike is the fact that 
neither the United States nor the Soviet Union could escape a massive re-
taliatory nuclear strike - is not in the long run an acceptable way of deal-
ing with nuclear weapons. The nuclear freeze movement has gathered 
unprecedented popular support in the United States and the West. There 
are indications of stirrings of opposition to nuclear weapons in communist 
countries as well. Since the advent of nuclear weapons, however, public 
opposition to them has risen, crested and dropped back. Whether or not the 
current tide of opposition will provide sufficient pressure to force govern-
ments to overcome the traditional obstacles to the regulation of armaments 
and disarmaments is impossible to predict. 
Failing this, another possible course would be to attempt to return to the 
concepts that made possible the limited nuclear test ban treaty and the sub-
sequent agreements and treaties. It is a much less satisfying path, for it 
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involves incremental, rather than dramatic, progress and living with, rather 
than eliminating, nuclear weapons. The United States would have to ac-
cept arms control as primarily a device for reducing the risk of nuclear and 
possibly conventional conflict, not as a brake on Soviet expenditures. The 
United States may no longer find this an attractive prospect; yet if the tradi-
tional obstacles cannot be overcome, the only other course could be an ex-
pensive and dangerous arms race. 
